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I. INTRODUCTION
“Instead of trying to discourage private litigation, reforms should
strive to make it work.”1
For the past several decades, Congress has struggled to develop a
system of private litigation that works for securities fraud claims.
Most notably, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (the Reform Act) of 1995 in response to complaints that
plaintiffs were abusing the litigation process.2 Specifically, many individuals alleged that plaintiffs were excessively filing frivolous
claims, or strike suits, hoping the corporations they sued would succumb to the pressures of litigation and settle.3 Accordingly, the Re-


J.D., Florida State University College of Law, 2011; B.S. Finance, Florida State
University College of Business, 2008. The author wishes to thank Professor Manuel Utset
for his helpful comments and guidance on earlier drafts. The author also wishes to thank
her family for their constant support and guidance.
1. Shannon Rose Selden, (Self-)Policing the Market: Congress’s Flawed Approach to
Securities Law Reform, 33 J. LEGIS. 57, 96 (2006).
2. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
3. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683; see also
Richard M. Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995: Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs, Defendants
and Lawyers, 51 BUS. LAW. 1009 (1996). Strike suits are suits “based on no valid claim,
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form Act established certain procedural barriers, including a heightened pleading standard and mandatory stay on discovery, aimed at
preventing plaintiffs from bringing such claims.4 As a result, courts
began to dismiss more securities fraud cases, finding they did not
comply with the Reform Act’s new procedural requirements.5
However, the Reform Act has failed to truly “make it work.” While
the Reform Act has successfully screened out more frivolous claims,
the increased dismissal rate, in light of recent corporate fraud and
accounting scandals, has exposed an adverse consequence of the legislation. Namely, the strict procedural barriers allow some securities
fraud to go undeterred and unpunished.6 In short, the Reform Act may
preclude plaintiffs with legitimate claims from succeeding in litigation.7
This problem may be explained by the principal-agent relationship that exists between investors and corporations. Specifically, private securities litigation embodies what is known as the informed
defendant model, a scenario wherein the corporation, but not the investor, knows whether it has violated federal securities law, creating
an information asymmetry.8 The provisions of the Reform Act further
skew this asymmetry in favor of the corporation, creating a defendant-friendly securities litigation regime. Thus, Congress overlooked
the need to reach a balance between procedural safeguards that prevent frivolous litigation and devices that deter corporate wrongdoing.9 Instead, the Reform Act focused on eliminating the previous
hardships felt by corporations at the hands of aggressive plaintiffs.
Accordingly, Congress needs to reexamine these competing objectives
to provide a workable system where plaintiffs will be unsuccessful if
they file frivolous claims and corporations will not only be deterred
by the threat of litigation but also punished if they violate federal
securities laws.



for nuisance value or as leverage to obtain a favorable or inflated settlement.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 679 (9th ed. 2004).
4. See Phillips & Miller, supra note 3, at 1018.
5. Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U.
ILL. L. REV. 913, 969 (2003).
6. Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the Effect
of the PSLRA’s Internal-Information Standard on ’33 and ’34 Act Claims, 76 WASH. U. L.Q.
537, 564 (1998).
7. See id. at 538 (arguing “the Reform Act implements a standard that is outcome determinative and, if strictly applied, virtually impossible to meet”).
8. See Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 550 (1997).
9. These competing interests were discussed in the Second Circuit case In re Time
Warner Securities Litigation. The court in that case noted regulation and litigation must
balance the “interest in deterring fraud in the securities markets” with the “interest in
deterring the use of the litigation process as a device for extracting undeserved settlements
as the price of avoiding the extensive discovery costs that frequently ensue once a complaint survives dismissal.” In re Time Warner Inc. Securities Litigation, 9 F.3d 259, 263 (2d
Cir. 1993).
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While no standard could achieve the perfect balance, this Note attempts to examine the steps necessary to reach a more auspicious
equilibrium. First, Part II of this Note discusses the history and importance of private securities litigation. Additionally, it details the
abusive practices of plaintiffs’ attorneys that led Congress to seek
reform. Part III then discusses Congress’s answer to the problem—
the Reform Act—and the consequences that followed. Part IV explains the failures of the Reform Act through common notions of
game theory. Specifically, this Part frames private securities litigation as a sequential game between principal and agent entrenched
with information asymmetries that are only amplified by the provisions in the Reform Act. Most importantly, this Part recognizes that
the Reform Act’s procedural barriers may be too high, preventing
some plaintiffs with meritorious claims from succeeding and allowing
securities fraud to remain unpunished. Lastly, Part V suggests certain
modifications to the current regime to reduce these information
asymmetries and create a more favorable system of private securities
litigation. In particular, this Part suggests lowering the procedural
barriers under the Reform Act by adopting a lower pleading standard,
instituting a judicially managed discovery process, and implementing
factors similar to those used by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to evaluate a motion to dismiss. Additionally, this Part
calls Congress to reevaluate the perceived harms of frivolous litigation and recognize its possibility to produce positive externalities.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION AND THE
EXPLOSION OF ABUSIVE LITIGATION PRACTICES
A. Background of Federal Securities Law and Private Litigation
Under the Fraud Provisions
Following the events of the Great Depression, Congress sought to
improve government intervention in the securities market10 with the
passage of the Securities Act of 1933 (the ’33 Act)11 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the ’34 Act).12 With this legislation, Congress
hoped to “increase investor confidence” in the marketplace.13 However, the mere presence of these regulations was not enough to prevent another financial disaster. Thus, Congress provided for two
separate methods of enforcing the Acts.14 First, the SEC was given



10. Evan Hill, The Rule 10b-5 Suit: Loss Causation Pleading Standards in Private Securities Fraud Claims After Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2659,
2665 (2010).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 77a, et seq. (2006).
12. Id. § 78a, et seq.
13. Brandon C. Helms, The Supreme Court’s Dura Decision Unfortunately Secures a
Brighter Future for 10b-5 Defendants, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 189, 189 (2006).
14. Id.
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primary authority to bring enforcement actions against violators.15
Yet, the SEC has limited resources and is unable to pursue every alleged violation of securities law.16 Therefore, private securities litigation has been deemed the “necessary supplement” to SEC enforcement action and the second means of enforcing the Acts.17
Most private class actions are brought under the “catchall” fraud
provisions18—section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5—
because of their broad scope.19 Section 10(b) prohibits the use of “manipulative or deceptive device[s]” in violation of any SEC Rule.20 This
provision also permits the SEC to promulgate rules necessary for the
enforcement of section 10(b),21 leading to the adoption of Rule 10b-5.22
Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful for any person to “employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud” or to make misleading statements or
omit material facts that would mislead others in “connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.”23 Although these provisions do not
explicitly provide investors with the right to sue, courts have consistently implied private rights of action.24 The elements required to establish a securities fraud claim under these provisions include: “(1) a
material misrepresentation (or omission) . . . (2) scienter, i.e., a
wrongful state of mind . . . (3) a connection with the purchase or sale
of a security . . . (4) reliance, often referred to in cases involving public securities markets (fraud-on-the-market cases) as ‘transaction
causation’ . . . (5) economic loss . . . and (6) ‘loss causation’ . . . . ”25
Private rights of action, specifically class actions, produce numerous benefits. In particular, they provide an avenue for harmed investors to receive financial recovery.26 They also reduce the negative externalities of securities fraud, such as decreased “investors’ confidence in the economy,” “inaccurate pricing signals,” and “misallocation of capital.”27 Under class actions, individual shareholders who
would normally find litigation inefficient and costly are able to com-



15. Id.
16. Brian S. Sommer, The PSLRA Decade of Decadence: Improving Balance in the Private Securities Litigation Arena with a Screening Panel Approach, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 413,
419 (2005); see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as Pragmatic Ex
Post Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV. 63, 101 (2008) (arguing the SEC is faced with scarce resources and agency capture).
17. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
18. Hill, supra note 10, at 2662.
19. See Phillips & Miller, supra note 3, at 1031; see also Hill, supra note 10, at 2662.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
21. Id.
22. Hill, supra note 10, at 2667.
23. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
24. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975).
25. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005) (emphasis omitted).
26. Phillips & Miller, supra note 3, at 1029.
27. Robert Allen, Securities Litigation as a Coordination Problem, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
475, 493 (2009).
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bine their claims with other shareholders in a cost-effective manner.28
Additionally, class actions promote investor confidence in our markets by enforcing a system of disclosure. Punishing those who make
false representations ensures most information disclosed to the public is accurate.29 Moreover, private actions deter securities fraud violations30 by increasing the likelihood corporations will be sued for
their wrongdoings.31
B. The Explosion of Abusive Litigation Practices
Beginning in the 1970s, private securities litigation “evolved from
a ‘necessary supplement to [SEC] action’ to a state of ‘vexatiousness’
more prevalent and severe than other types of litigation.”32 Plaintiffs
began to take advantage of the lax rules of federal procedure in order
to pursue abusive tactics. While Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure only requires plaintiffs to plead a “short and plain statement” of the claim,33 securities claims are subject to the specialized
pleading standard of fraud found in Rule 9(b). Under Rule 9(b), a
complaint must “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake”; yet, the complaint can assert generally
“[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s
mind.”34 However, courts rarely granted motions to dismiss for failing
to sufficiently state a securities fraud claim under these standards.35
Courts maintained such motions would only be granted in limited
instances where “ ‘it appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him
to relief.’ ”36
These lenient rules permitted plaintiffs to file often and file fast
without regard to the merits of their claim. For example, class action
plaintiffs would often file “stock drop” cases—a lawsuit spawned by
an abrupt drop in a company’s stock price almost immediately after



28. Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act?, 23 J.L. ECON & ORG. 598, 590 (2007).
29. Ryan G. Miest, Note, Would the Real Scienter Please Stand Up: The Effect of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 on Pleading Securities Fraud, 82 MINN. L.
REV. 1103, 1104 (1998).
30. See Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the
Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10B-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
1301, 1318 (2008).
31. Shaun Mulreed, Note, Private Securities Litigation Reform Failure: How Scienter
has Prevented the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 From Achieving Its Goals,
42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 779, 784 (2005).
32. Sommer, supra note 16, at 420 (alteration in original).
33. FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
34. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
35. Phillips & Miller, supra note 3, at 1034.
36. Id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 335 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (citations omitted)).
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bad news about the company was publicly announced.37 These claims
were filed within days and sometimes even hours after the price
dropped.38 Accordingly, plaintiffs’ attorneys engaged in “fishing expedition[s],” attempting to find evidence supporting their claim after
the complaint was filed.39 Such expeditions were possible under broad
discovery provisions40 and infrequently imposed sanctions.41 Plaintiffs’ attorneys were also able to bring as many suits as possible
through a diversification approach. Particularly, plaintiffs’ firms
would “file many suits, with a minimum investment of resources in
each suit, and to develop a stable income stream from their contingent
fee arrangements.”42 Since only a few suits would prove unsuccessful,
there was little “downside risk” to filing as many as possible.43
Further, in securities fraud lawsuits, the plaintiff and defendant
face asymmetric discovery burdens. While plaintiffs incur minimal
costs,44 defendants are required to produce numerous records and deponents, making the process extremely “expensive and timeconsuming.”45 These costs ultimately induce corporations to settle
without regard to the merits of the plaintiff’s claim.46 Aware of this,
plaintiffs’ attorneys engaged in “legalized ‘extortion,’ ”47 filing meritless suits as “ ‘leverage to obtain a favorable or inflated settlement’ ”
from the corporations they sued.48
The fraud-on-the-market theory, upheld in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,49 further alleviated what little obstacles stood in the way of
plaintiffs bringing frivolous claims. Among other things, a plaintiff
must prove reliance on a material misstatement or omission to recover under a section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 claim.50 However, the fraud-



37. James C. Dugan, Securities Litigation and the Economic Crisis: Leading Lawyers on
Understanding the Current Legal Environment, Developing Litigation Best Practices, and
Helping Clients Respond to a Changing Marketplace, 2009 WL 1615203 (Aspatore), at *1
(Apr. 2009).
38. See Phillips & Miller, supra note 3, at 1011 (describing lawsuits that were filed less
than five hours after Philip Morris announced a decrease in its earnings in 1993).
39. John F. Olson et al., Pleading Reform, Plaintiff Qualification and Discovery Stays
Under the Reform Act, 51 BUS. LAW. 1101, 1112 (1996).
40. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b).
41. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
42. Phillips & Miller, supra note 3, at 1036.
43. See id. at 1037.
44. Olson et al., supra note 39, at 1112.
45. Selden, supra note 1, at 75.
46. See Charles M. Yablon, Essay, A Dangerous Supplement? Longshot Claims and Private Securities Litigation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 567, 585 (2000).
47. Richard H. Walker et al., The New Securities Class Action: Federal Obstacles, State
Detours, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 641, 645 (1997).
48. Damian Moos, Note, Pleading Around the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act:
Reevaluating the Pleading Requirements for Market Manipulation Claims, 78 S. CAL. L. REV.
763, 763-64 (2005) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 679 (2d Pocket ed. 2001)).
49. 485 U.S. 224, 250 (1988) (“It is not inappropriate to apply a presumption of reliance
supported by the fraud-on-the-market theory.”).
50. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005).
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on-the-market theory precludes the need to prove reliance on misleading statements or disclosures.51 Instead, a plaintiff may claim the
misstatements or omissions “caused her to pay a purchase price that
is higher than it would have been but for the misstatement,”52 relying
on the semi-strong presumption of market efficiency.53 Thus, as long
as investors purchase the stock in an efficient market, misleading
statements can defraud investors based on the effect it has on the
stock price.54 While this theory has been subsequently limited by the
Supreme Court,55 plaintiffs could nevertheless file suits based on
misstatements or omissions without ever reading the company’s disclosure documents.56
These abusive practices not only harmed innocent corporations
but also created negative implications market wide. First, abusive
litigation undercuts the integrity of the judicial system.57 It also leads
to poor public disclosure practices. With the constant possibility of
strike suits, corporate managers are less inclined to make public
statements for fear what they say could be subsequently used against
them.58 Additionally, corporations incur costs defending meritless
suits, which may be passed along to the shareholders.59 The Supreme
Court recognized the problems of frivolous securities litigation in
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores.60 Particularly, the Court
noted two separate concerns: (1) the pendency of a meritless lawsuit
“may frustrate or delay normal business activity of the defendant,”
and (2) the “liberal discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure” permit plaintiffs with “largely groundless claim[s] to simply take up the time of a number of other people . . . [imposing] a social cost rather than a benefit.”61 As then SEC Chairman Arthur
Levitt noted, “the pendulum had swung too far toward plaintiffs, and
it needed to be brought into better balance.”62



51. Rose, supra note 30, at 1311.
52. Merritt B. Fox, Understanding Dura, 60 BUS. LAW. 1547, 1548 (2005).
53. The semi-strong theory of market efficiency posits that stock prices represent all
publicly available information, including material misstatements. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 246.
54. See id. at 247.
55. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 347-48. The Court in Dura held the fact a price was inflated
by misstatements at the time of purchase is insufficient, standing alone, to establish the loss
on the sale after the company disclosed the truth was caused by the misstatement. Id. Instead, the plaintiff must plead some additional information indicating a causal connection
between misstatements and the loss. Id.
56. Rose, supra note 30, at 1312.
57. Phillips & Miller, supra note 3, at 1027.
58. Allen, supra note 27, at 502.
59. Id. at 481.
60. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
61. Id. at 740, 741.
62. Arthur Levitt, “Final Thoughts on Litigation Reform”: Remarks by Chairman Arthur
Levitt United States Securities and Exchange Commission 23rd Annual Securities Regulation
Institute San Diego, California, January 24, 1996, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 835, 838 (1996).

918

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:911

III. A CALL FOR REFORM: CONGRESSIONAL ACTION TO CURB
VEXATIOUS LITIGATION
A. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
To combat the problems of vexatious litigation, Congress passed
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act on December 22, 1995.63
The Reform Act was designed to promote voluntary disclosure by issuers, provide investors with primary authority over private litigation, and encourage plaintiffs to bring legitimate claims.64 Overall,
the legislation sought to balance the interest of deterring securities
fraud with the interest of deterring abusive litigation practices.65 Accordingly, Congress erected certain procedural hurdles to prevent
plaintiffs from engaging in speculative litigation.66 These provisions,
codified in section 21D of the ’34 Act, include: (1) a heightened pleading requirement coupled with a stay on discovery if a motion to dismiss is filed;67 (2) the “most adequate plaintiff” rule—requiring courts
to select an appropriate lead plaintiff in class action suits;68 and (3)
mandatory Rule 11 sanctions imposed against attorneys for filing
meritless claims.69
The heightened pleading standard is considered the most controversial provision of the Reform Act. It requires a complaint alleging a
misstatement or omission of material fact to “specify each statement
alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the
statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint
shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief is
formed.”70 While this section does not significantly differ from the
pre-Reform Act standard utilized by most courts, the following section establishing the pleading requirements for scienter is considered
more of a “wild card.”71 Specifically, it requires that a “complaint
shall . . . state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”72



63. Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737; see also Mulreed, supra note 31, at 780.
64. S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683.
65. Phillips & Miller, supra note 3, at 1009.
66. Id. at 1018.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3) (2006).
68. Id. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(i). A detailed discussion of this particular provision is outside the
scope of this Note.
69. Id. § 77z-1(c).
70. Id. § 78u-4(b)(1).
71. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or,
Why the Fat Lady has not Yet Sung, 51 BUS. LAW. 975, 978 (1996).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006). Following the passage of the Reform Act, courts were
imposing various interpretations of the “strong inference” requirement. One author recognized three different lines of cases that developed. Patricia J. Meyer, What Congress Said
About the Heightened Pleading Standard: A Proposed Solution to the Securities Fraud Pleading Confusion, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2517, 2535 (1998). However, the Supreme Court resolved
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While Congress was drafting the legislation, there was much debate surrounding these heightened pleading provisions. The most
notable opposition came from President Clinton, who vetoed the Reform Act, arguing the legislation would have the damaging effect of
“closing the courthouse door on investors who have legitimate
claims.”73 President Clinton was concerned the requirements to plead
scienter “impose[d] an unacceptable procedural hurdle to meritorious
claims being heard in Federal courts.”74 Nevertheless, Congress overrode the veto and passed the legislation.
The Reform Act also includes a provision that imposes a stay on
discovery when a motion to dismiss is filed.75 This provision sought to
eliminate abusive fishing expeditions76 and to reduce the high costs of
discovery that often compel innocent corporations to settle meritless
lawsuits.77 The stay will only be excused if discovery is “necessary to
preserve evidence or to prevent undue prejudice.”78 This provision,
when enforced with the heightened pleading standard, ensures only
the strongest complaints survive a motion to dismiss.
Further, Congress sought to “give[] teeth” to these provisions by
enhancing the sanctions for violations of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.79 Under Rule 11, claims must be supported by existing law while factual contentions must be supported by evidence.80
Section 21D(c) of the Exchange Act requires the court, upon completion of the case, to determine compliance with Rule 11.81 If a violation
is discovered, the court shall impose sanctions on the violating party,
consisting of reasonable attorney’s fees and other costs to be paid to
the opposing party.82 Ultimately, this provision requires courts to meticulously scrutinize the complaints filed before them and punish
those who file meritless claims.
B. The Consequences of the Reform Act
The Reform Act failed to achieve its primary goal—preventing
plaintiffs from filing frivolous lawsuits. Although the number of com-



this discrepancy in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007). The
Court in Tellabs required the inference of scienter to be “cogent and at least as compelling as
any plausible opposing inference.” Id. at 310.
73. William J. Clinton, Veto Message on the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act,
H.R. Doc. 140-150, 141 CONG. REC. 37797 (Dec. 19, 1995).
74. Id. at 37798.
75. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2006).
76. See Phillips & Miller, supra note 3, 1044.
77. Walker et al., supra note 47, at 648.
78. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2006).
79. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 39 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 738.
80. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c)(1) (2006).
82. Id. § 78u-4(c)(2)–(3)(A). Sanctions may be waived only if awarding attorney’s fees
will inflict an unreasonable and unjust burden on the violating party. Id. § 78u-4(c)(3)(B)(i).
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plaints filed initially decreased in 1996, this was mainly because
plaintiffs were taking their claims to state court where stricter standards had not been implemented.83 However, the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 preempted state law causes of
action for securities fraud and placed the claims back in federal
courts.84 Overall, the number of private actions filed increased after
the passage of the Reform Act.85 One study indicated that the average
number of securities issuers sued each year increased by 32% for six
years following the Reform Act’s enactment.86
The Reform Act’s inability to curtail frivolous litigation is attributable to the lack of downside risk plaintiffs currently face. Even after the passage of the Reform Act, plaintiffs find it cost-effective to
file as many strike suits as possible. Specifically, courts are still reluctant to impose sanctions for Rule 11 violations,87 allowing plaintiffs’ attorneys to freely carry on with their diversification strategies.88 And because the Reform Act has made it more difficult to survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs’ attorneys have even more incentive to not only bring as many suits as possible but also “throw every
available bit of favorable information into the complaint in hopes
that the judge will be induced by the sheer number of paragraphs to
conclude that the complaint has alleged fraud with specificity.”89
Yet, the Reform Act was not a complete failure. Specifically, the
Act successfully reduced the overall costs associated with frivolous
litigation in several ways.90 First, federal courts have dismissed more
complaints for failing to meet the Reform Act’s heightened pleading
standard.91 Following the passage of the Reform Act, the dismissal
rate more than doubled.92 In addition, the Reform Act has successfully slowed the “race to the courthouse.” Plaintiffs’ attorneys are
now taking more time to investigate actions before they file,93 evi-



83. Perino, supra note 5, at 931.
84. Securities Litigation on Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227.
85. Perino, supra note 5, at 929; see also Joel Seligman, Rethinking Private Securities
Litigation, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 111 (2004) (noting that “[b]etween 1991 and 1995, an average of 177 federal securities class actions were filed in federal court each year,” but
“[b]etween 1996 and 2001, an average of 186 federal securities class actions were brought
each year”).
86. Perino, supra note 5, at 930.
87. Id. at 938.
88. See id. at 937.
89. Geoffrey P. Miller, Pleading After Tellabs, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 507, 532 (2009).
90. See Perino, supra note 5, at 969.
91. Id.; see also Seligman, supra note 85, at 112 (finding the Ninth Circuit dismissed
61% of its claims and the Second Circuit dismissed 37% of its claims after the Reform Act
was passed).
92. Helms, supra note 13, at 190-91 (noting the dismissal rate increased from 11.2% to
25.1% after the enactment of the Reform Act); see also Burch, supra note 16, at 79 (noting the
dismissal rate as of 2008 was 39.1%).
93. Walker et al., supra note 47, at 684.
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denced by an increase in the time between a drop in the price of a
stock and the filing of a related lawsuit.94 Now, additional preparation is necessary to sufficiently state with particularity those facts
giving rise to a “strong inference” of fraudulent intent. Attorneys
have also modified the types of complaints filed since the passage of
the Reform Act. Instead of traditional stock drop cases, plaintiffs now
focus on accounting irregularities and insider trading,95 rendering the
complaints longer and more complicated as they discuss the mechanical nuances of accounting rules.96 Thus, the Reform Act imposed
obstacles that successfully prevent plaintiffs with frivolous claims
from surviving a motion to dismiss.
IV. THE REFORM ACT’S INFLUENCE ON FRAUDULENT ACTIVITY FROM
A GAME THEORETIC PERSPECTIVE
A. A Balancing of Errors
While it is likely that more frivolous claims are being dismissed,
the Reform Act has created consequences insufficiently considered by
the enacting Congress—consequences that may have potentially negative implications on the securities market. In particular, by establishing stricter procedural standards, courts are not only screening
out frivolous cases but also screening out cases with merit, creating a
“climate in which frauds are more likely to occur.”97 Thus, it appears
Congress preferred some meritorious claims to go unprosecuted rather than allow frivolous lawsuits that may harm corporations.98 But
given the recent wave of corporate fraud, including the events of Enron and WorldCom, was the trade-off really worth it?
One author has characterized this problem as an imbalance between Type I and Type II errors.99 A Type I error, also known as a
false positive, results when a defendant is found to have committed
securities fraud, when in reality no fraud transpired.100 This usually
occurs when a court allows frivolous claims to proceed to litigation.101



94. Perino, supra note 5, at 963 (noting a study that found the average filing delay before the Reform Act was 49 days, compared to an average filing delay of 79 days with a median filing delay of 38 days after the Reform Act).
95. See William S. Lerach, “The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995—27
Months Later”: Securities Class Action Litigation Under the Private Securities Litigation
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99. See Lynn A. Stout, Type I Error, Type II Error, and the Private Securities Litigation
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On the other hand, a Type II error, or a false negative, takes place
when a court dismisses a meritorious claim or mistakenly determines
no fraud has occurred.102 Congress has overlooked the importance of
balancing Type I and Type II errors to reach a viable equilibrium
that will both deter corporations from making fraudulent statements
while simultaneously deterring plaintiffs from filing frivolous claims.
Yet, achieving such a balance is easier said than done. Complications
arise from the inherent principle-agent relationship that exists between shareholders and corporate managers.
B. Modeling Private Securities Litigation as a Sequential Game
Between Agent and Principle
An agency relationship results when an investor (principle) gives
her money to a corporation (agent) to manage.103 In this type of agency relationship, the agent possesses information about the corporation the investor does not have.104 Thus, investors need to protect
themselves should the corporation abuse this information asymmetry
by making material misstatements or omissions.105 However, it is
costly for a principle to monitor the agent’s actions.106
Threat of litigation is one way to avoid monitoring costs, but a
plaintiff must first decide whether to bring suit. This decision can be
framed as a multi-player, sequential game between the investor and
the corporation. Under the norms of game theory, a sequential game
involves a situation where the players make alternating moves.107
One player’s move will depend upon the previous and possible future
actions of the other player.108 Additionally, each player must “anticipate the future decisions” and reason backwards to make the correct
choice at earlier points in the game.109 At the outset, it is important to
note corporations in this sequential game are repeat players. They
will continue to issue securities and thus will continue to be sued by
investors who believe they were injured. Therefore, the corporation’s
actions should send credible signals to both investors in the current
game and the entire market for possible future games.
The decision to bring suit for a section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 violation begins after the plaintiff believes a manager or executive of a
company in which she holds stock has made a misstatement or omis-
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sion of material fact. The plaintiff must then decide whether or not to
file suit. A plaintiff will sue if she knows her suit has merit or if she
is unsure of the merits because no preliminary investigation has been
performed.110 Additionally, when deciding whether to sue, a rational
plaintiff will consider the costs involved. Plaintiffs incur nominal
costs when filing a securities fraud claim,111 particularly if they aggregate their claim with other plaintiffs in the form of a class action.112 However, the Reform Act requires plaintiffs to engage in
backward reasoning when making this initial decision. Specifically, if
a plaintiff determines her complaint would not survive a motion to
dismiss if one was filed, or if she believes she may be subject to the
Reform Act’s stricter Rule 11 sanctions, it is likely the plaintiff will
decide to not bring suit.
If a plaintiff does file a lawsuit, the corporation must then decide
whether to make a settlement offer or litigate the claim.113 At this
point in the sequential game, the corporation may use the information asymmetry between the principle and agent to its advantage.
The corporation knows whether it committed securities fraud and, if
fraud has occurred, a corporation would prefer to settle instead of
proceed to litigation. Litigation is costly and class actions force corporations to redirect their resources from their “best use” to defending
allegations of securities fraud.114 Moreover, an adverse judgment
against the corporation could damage its reputation and profitability.115
If a corporation offers to settle, the plaintiff must decide whether
to accept or reject the offer.116 In most instances, a plaintiff faced with
this kind of information inequity would likely accept the settlement
offer. For example, assume the plaintiff files suit but has not performed an investigation to determine the merits of her claim. Further
assume, as is true in most securities fraud cases, the corporation is
unaware whether the plaintiff knows if her claim is meritorious or
frivolous.117 A corporation’s offer to settle signals to the plaintiff her
case may have merit and allows her to free ride off the corporation’s
actions without undergoing the costs of investigation.118 If the plaintiff rejects the corporation’s settlement offer or the corporation re-
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fuses to settle, the plaintiff must then decide whether to litigate or
drop the case.119
C. The Informed Defendant Model: Increasing the Information Gap
Between Plaintiff and Defendant
The sequential game discussed in the previous section is known
as the informed defendant model. It represents a scenario where the
defendant, but not the plaintiff, knows if a suit is meritless,120 creating information asymmetries the defendant may use to its advantage.
While the informed defendant model contemplates a corporation
faced with a lawsuit will either settle or not, it fails to consider a
third option made more viable under the Reform Act. Specifically,
corporations may also respond by filing a motion to dismiss. As evidenced by the increased dismissal rates in the post-Reform Act era,
this seems to be a popular option.121 Therefore, plaintiffs, as players
in this sequential game, must recognize defendants may file a motion to
dismiss when they make the initial decision of whether to bring suit.
The defendant-friendly regime created by the Reform Act coupled
with the nature of the informed defendant model makes filing a motion to dismiss an advantageous choice for corporations. Doing so
prevents plaintiffs from leveling the informational playing field. Particularly, once a motion to dismiss is filed, the Reform Act mandates
a stay on discovery,122 preventing plaintiffs from gathering any information on their claim that is not publicly available. The heightened pleading standard, therefore, incorrectly “assumes that in meritorious fraud cases, public information will provide sufficient evidence of intent to enable plaintiffs to meet this high threshold.”123 In
actuality, the heightened pleading standard places plaintiffs in a
“procedural catch 22.”124 Assuming most corporations do not disclose
their fraudulent intentions publicly, plaintiffs are unable to uncover
sufficient information that meets the Reform Act’s strict standards to
survive a motion to dismiss, potentially screening out meritorious
claims. These “excessive restrictions to pursuing securities fraud
claims . . . insulate fraudfeasors from suit and filter meritorious lawsuits.”125 Therefore, the Reform Act allows some violations of federal
securities law to remain unpunished.
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Moreover, the information asymmetries under the informed defendant model make a motion to dismiss a more attractive option
than settlement or litigation. Filing a motion to dismiss sends a signal, although perhaps an inaccurate one, to uninformed plaintiffs
that their complaint is frivolous. Plaintiffs normally rely on these
signals since they rarely perform initial investigations.126 Thus, a
plaintiff faced with such motion may drop the case. Additionally, corporations may file a motion to dismiss to prevent plaintiffs from uncovering information that reveals other misdeeds of the corporation.
Additionally, cases decided by the Supreme Court following the
passage of the Reform Act only made it more difficult for plaintiffs
with legitimate claims to succeed. For example, in 2005, the Supreme
Court decided Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo.127 The plaintiffs
in Dura brought a securities fraud action against managers and directors of the company, claiming the company’s false statements
about the expected approval of a new device by the Food and Drug
Administration inflated the price of the stock.128 The Court, however,
determined the complaint was “legally insufficient,” reasoning the
inflated purchase price, by itself, did not prove loss causation.129 Instead, a plaintiff must be able to provide “some indication of the loss
and the causal connection.”130 Consequently, Dura made it more difficult for plaintiffs to meet the loss causation element for a section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claim.
Two years later, the Supreme Court decided a case that would
raise the bar for plaintiffs even higher. In Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., the Court attempted to establish a uniform interpretation of the Reform Act’s pleading requirement for fraudulent
intent.131 While the Court recognized the need to balance the “twin
goals” of private securities litigation—preventing frivolous filings
while protecting defrauded investors132—it seems the Court ultimately sided with the corporations. Specifically, the Court held an
“inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable—it must be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing
inference of nonfraudulent intent.”133 Together, these cases have diminished the probability plaintiffs with valid claims may “successfully . . . litigate a securities fraud claim.”134
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Accordingly, some have speculated that the Reform Act’s effect of
screening out meritorious suits is linked to the surge of corporate
fraud in the early 2000s, including the Enron and WorldCom scandals.135 Although it is unlikely that the Reform Act’s severe provisions
were the leading cause of this rise in crime,136 they may have been a
contributing factor. The ease with which meritorious claims may be
dismissed has lessened private litigation’s deterrence effect on securities fraud. Specifically, the Reform Act has “encouraged aggressive
marketplace behavior.”137 While unconstrained aggressiveness may
be beneficial for a corporation’s bottom line, it is detrimental to the
market as a whole. For example, recent incidents of corporate fraud
“have led many ordinary Americans to conclude that our securities
fraud deterrence regime is broken.”138 Ultimately, the Reform Act
overcorrected the perceived abuses of frivolous litigation and shifted the
pendulum away from plaintiffs and too far in favor of corporations.
V. RESTORING BALANCE BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT
While some argue the Reform Act strikes an appropriate balance
between Type I and Type II errors,139 the above discussion illustrates
otherwise. The Reform Act’s procedural barriers reduced the occurrence of Type I errors by screening out frivolous litigation. However,
the Reform Act has overcorrected by allowing more Type II errors,
effectively precluding meritorious claims from reaching settlement or
litigation. Therefore, Congress must take curative measures to attain
a better balance between these competing errors. Specifically, reforms should work to reduce the procedural obstacles plaintiffs face
by requiring a lesser pleading standard and instituting a judicially
managed discovery process. Additionally, Congress should require
the SEC to promulgate standards that courts may use when ruling
on motions to dismiss in private securities fraud cases.
These modifications find some support in the theory that frivolous litigation may actually generate positive externalities that help
combat securities fraud. While much literature discusses the downfalls of frivolous litigation,140 Congress should reevaluate these perceived harms and recognize the possible benefits. Society is concerned Americans are “too litigious” and that “frivolous litigation is
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out of control”;141 however, there is no clear base line of what comprises frivolity.142 It is arguable frivolous litigation may generate
benefits similar to legitimate class actions, such as deterrence, transparency, and accountability.143 For example, a plaintiff who brings a
meritless section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 claim may uncover other violations of the corporation. Thus, preventing plaintiffs with even frivolous claims from partaking in discovery could allow other securities
fraud violations to remain unexposed and unpunished.
A. Lowering the Pleading Standard
Prior to the Reform Act, circuit courts were split over how scienter under a section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 claim should be pled.144 The
most noted division existed between the Second and Ninth Circuits.
Taking the stricter approach, the Second Circuit required that facts
set forth in the complaint “give[] rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent.”145 Conversely, the more lenient Ninth Circuit held scienter may be averred generally, “simply by saying that scienter existed.”146 However, it appears the Reform Act adopted the Second Circuit’s test, as it requires a complaint to “state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
required state of mind.”147
Utilizing the Second Circuit’s “strong inference” test, the Reform
Act attempted to increase the litigation risks faced by plaintiffs,148
placing more weight on their initial decision of whether to bring suit.
Yet, as previously mentioned, the heightened pleading standard was
unsuccessful in this regard. Instead, the “strong inference” test is
overinclusive in its impact and, “if strictly applied and interpreted,
will eliminate most private securities-fraud lawsuits.”149 Fraudulent
intent is difficult to demonstrate,150 particularly if plaintiffs are foreclosed from discovery, as corporations would be unwise to reveal their
fraudulent intentions publicly. Thus, requiring facts demonstrating a
“strong inference” before the opportunity for discovery imposes an
excessive burden on plaintiffs.151
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Accordingly, Congress should lower the pleading requirements
and allow existing law to serve as the initial screening device.152 Rule
9(b) already requires complaints to “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.”153 Moreover, the Supreme Court’s
decision in Tellabs requires these circumstances be convincing and as
“compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.”154
Expanding upon these requirements in the Reform Act is merely
“duplicative and unduly burdensome.”155 If the complaint is truly frivolous, the corporation will know that fact and can fight to defend the
allegations by either filing a motion to dismiss or litigating the claim.
Litigating not only allows a corporation to defend against existing
frivolous claims but also allows the corporation, as a repeat player in
this sequential game, to send signals to future plaintiffs indicating
the corporation will not submit to the pressures of frivolous litigation
and settle. Furthermore, concerns of abusive litigation can be addressed further down the line with judicially managed discovery and
higher thresholds for motions to dismiss that do not focus exactingly
on the face of the complaint.
B. Judicially Managed Discovery
The Reform Act’s mandated stay on discovery amplifies the information asymmetry between investor and corporation. Preventing
investors from obtaining information in support of their securities
fraud claims places plaintiffs at a significant disadvantage. Additionally, the stay on discovery allows corporations to exploit the information gap created by the Reform Act by sending plaintiffs false signals
about the merits of their claim through filing a motion to dismiss.
Plaintiffs are unable to determine the validity of such signals unless
verification is available through public information. Therefore, to reduce the information disparity between corporations and investors
and to enhance corporate transparency, Congress should eliminate
the Reform Act’s stay on discovery provision and implement a modified discovery process.
Instead of prohibiting discovery, courts should partake in the
“[j]udicial management” of private securities fraud cases.156 Under
this modified process, a motion to dismiss would trigger judicially
managed discovery. The court could then set a time limit for the
plaintiff, establishing a certain number of days for permissible discovery. During this time, the court may frame the discovery process
as it sees fit—limiting the amount of depositions or document re-
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quests produced by either party. When the allotted time expires, the
plaintiff would be allowed to resubmit a complaint pleading any additional factors uncovered during discovery in support of her claim. At
this point, the court would analyze the plaintiff’s complaint under
Rule 9(b) and the Tellabs standard, in addition to suggested factors
borrowed from the SEC (discussed in the next section), to determine
if the motion to dismiss should be granted or denied.
Judicial management can reduce the costs normally imposed on
corporate defendants and allows courts to “establish the scope and
pace of permissible discovery.”157 Furthermore, eliminating the stay
on discovery encourages plaintiffs to perform their own investigation
to determine the merits of their case, instead of free riding on the
corporation’s actions in the sequential game. Then, if a plaintiff realizes after investigation that her claim is meritless, she is free to drop
the case. Furthermore, imposing a modified discovery process would
permit more shareholders with valid claims to bring successful suits,
combating the negative externalities created by securities fraud. Allowing plaintiffs to uncover facts under the discretion of the judge
will lead to more complaints that plead the requisite strong inference
of scienter. This, in turn, will increase the successful prosecution of
securities fraud. It will also “increase corporate transparency” by exposing the “targeted information about the corporate practices” uncovered in the discovery process.158
Judicial management of discovery, however, is not without its
problems. Plaintiffs may still be enticed to file frivolous claims first
and engage in abusive fishing expeditions later to leverage a settlement from the corporation. However, judicial scrutiny over the discovery process should work to reduce this problem. Nevertheless,
modified discovery is only one factor necessary to create an appropriate balance between Type I and Type II errors. Assistance from the
SEC will also help limit abusive practices.
C. Integration of Securities and Exchange Commission Standards
into the Private Realm
Some scholars argue the best approach to balancing Type I and
Type II errors is to eliminate private enforcement altogether, providing the SEC with exclusive authority over securities fraud enforcement.159 While the SEC has specialized knowledge and experience in
securities fraud, this approach ignores the reality that the SEC faces
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many limitations.160 Instead, private litigation should borrow from
some of the SEC’s expertise and practices.
The SEC considers certain factors when deciding whether to impose penalties on a corporation for securities fraud.161 These factors
include: “[t]he need to deter the particular type of offense,” “[t]he extent of the injury . . . [suffered by] the innocent part[y],” “[t]he level of
intent on the part of the perpetrator[],” how difficult it is to detect
that type of violation, and the “[p]resence or lack of remedial steps”
on behalf of the corporation.162 Congress should require the SEC to
create similar factors to be used by courts when presented with a motion to dismiss. These factors would be considered in addition to
whether the complaint satisfies Rule 9(b) and the Tellabs standard,
thereby establishing a higher threshold to survive a motion to dismiss while effectively transforming the pleading standard into another factor the court would consider.
Whether a complaint meets the strong inference standard under
Tellabs is important as an initial screening device; however, that
standard should not be dispositive in a court’s decision to dismiss a
complaint. Allowing courts to consider other important factors increases the likelihood meritorious cases will succeed. SEC involvement in this fashion provides an additional, but more lenient, level of
screening out frivolous filings, while assisting plaintiffs disadvantaged by the information asymmetries under the informed defendant
model. Moreover, as plaintiffs would have had the opportunity to uncover facts in judicially managed discovery, it is more likely those
with frivolous complaints would decide to drop their cases, while legitimate claims would survive a motion to dismiss if one were filed.
Nevertheless, some may argue such factors will cause uncertainty
in private securities litigation and remove some judicial decisionmaking authority from the court. In particular, it is possible courts will
not apply these factors uniformly. Yet, courts are frequently tasked
with the responsibility of applying similar factor tests. To assist in
this responsibility, courts could receive more assistance from the
SEC. Particularly, courts could analyze the proffered factors with regards to a specific case and submit, in writing, its analysis to the
SEC for review. Regardless, instituting such factors balances the potentially adverse effects of lowering the pleading standard.
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D. Why Stricter Rule 11 Sanctions Will Not Work
Many have suggested stricter Rule 11 sanctions will reduce abusive litigation practices, particularly if a lower pleading standard has
been recommended.163 One author has even suggested applying different levels of sanctions based on assorted types of Rule 11 violations.164 This approach would require Congress to classify different
violations and create a corresponding sanctions rubric.165 Courts
would institute a sliding scale approach, imposing lower sanctions for
less serious violations that incrementally increase with the severity
of the violation.166 However, while sanctions may deter frivolous litigation in other areas of law, they may not be as effective in private
securities litigation.
In an area of law where the underlying crime involves disclosure
of information, stricter sanctions may not be an appropriate measure
of deterrence. Corporations have incentives to hide adverse information from the public. Particularly, corporations may lie because of
“greed, fear, pressure, [and] opportunity.”167 Moreover, corporations
will work to keep the truth hidden from the public. To effectively deter frivolous litigation, sanctions must be high enough that plaintiffs
will “internalize the net social costs of the contemplated misbehavior,”168 yet not so high that it would lead to overdeterrence.169 Plaintiffs would have to consider the additional factor of Rule 11 sanctions
when making the initial decision of whether to bring suit. As a result,
strict sanctions imposed on plaintiffs for failure to uncover hidden
information would significantly increase their downside risk and potentially dissuade both meritless and meritorious claims from being
filed. Thus, Rule 11 sanctions should be left to the discretion of the
court so as to not deter investors from bringing legitimate claims.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is clear the Reform Act overcorrected the perceived abuses of
private securities litigation. The increased dismissal rates in the
post-Reform Act era indicate that while courts were successfully
screening out frivolous litigation, they were also preventing meritorious claims from proceeding to trial. Further, the Reform Act has created an even wider information gap between investors and corpora-
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tions than previously existed under their principle-agent relationship. Corporations may exploit this information asymmetry through
the procedural barriers of the Reform Act, allowing some corporate
fraud to slip through the cracks that private litigation was originally
designed to fill.
Private securities litigation needs to reclaim its responsibility as
the necessary supplement to the SEC by effectively deterring and
punishing securities fraud. Although finding an appropriate solution
is not easy, Congress can take certain steps to “make it work.”170 By
lowering the procedural bar established by the Reform Act, plaintiffs
with meritorious claims are more likely to survive a motion to dismiss,
particularly if judicially managed discovery is permitted. Additionally,
even plaintiffs who may have initially filed frivolous claims should be
allowed to perform discovery in the instance they might uncover other violations committed by the corporation. This, in turn, improves
corporate transparency and accountability. Further, reducing the initial screening requirements for a section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claim
allows courts to institute stricter standards after discovery has taken
place, applying standards similar to those currently utilized by the
SEC. While this method is not guaranteed to achieve the perfect balance, “society must bear the risk that some suits will be brought
when fraud has not occurred” if “actual fraud is to be combatted.”171
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